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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates whether Malaysian publicly listed companies in
10 sectors use deferred tax and discretionary accruals as tools to manage
earnings in order to meet earning targets: 1) to avoid an earning decline
and 2) to avoid a loss. This research examines financial statements
prepared during the period 2003 to 2005 when the Malaysian Accounting
Standard Board (MASB) 25 Accounting for Income Taxes was in place.
This study uses Burgstahler and Dichev's approach to identify earnings
management firms. Healy's model and a modified Jones model are also
employed to identify and separate accruals. The results show no evidence
that deferred tax has been used by firms as a tool to manage earnings
during the period of study. The finding suggests that the implementation
of the MASB 25 (now known as Financial Reporting Standard (FRS)
112), which is more comprehensive and specific than lAS 12, has reduced
the use ofdeferred tax by firms in managing their earnings. In contrast,
the findings of this study provide evidence that firms use discretionary
accruals to avoid reporting losses. The results of this study may be ofuse
to researchers studying earnings management behavior andfor standard
setters with regard to establishing and monitoring standards.
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INTRODUCTION
From 1981 to 2002, income tax accounting practices in Malaysia were
governed by the Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB)
Approved Accounting Standard lAS 12 Accounting for Taxes on Income
(the original lAS 12) (2002). The original lAS 12 focused on income
statements and timing differences, which resulted in differences in the
accounting and taxable profits (Hoe, 2003). This standard was superseded
by the MASB 25 Accounting for Income Taxes, which came into effect
from July 2002 (now known as the Financial Reporting Standard (FRS)
112), which focuses on balance sheets and temporary differences.
Under MASB 25 all temporary differences (also known as book
tax differences) between accounting and tax rules should be accounted
for in financial statements. Temporary differences occur when there are
differences between the valuation of an asset or liability for tax purposes
and its carrying amount in the financial statement balance sheet. This
difference results in future tax liability or tax assets, also known as
deferred tax. MASB 25 stipulates that any changes in deferred tax assets
and deferred tax liabilities should be reflected in the Income Statement.
Previous studies have argued that book tax differences are influenced
by managerial practices in smoothing accounting earnings by reducing
or deferring tax payment to serve management interests (Mills and
Newberry, 2001; Phillips et al., 2003; Plesko, 2004). Mills and Newberry
(2001) argued that managers typically have more discretion in financial
reporting than in tax reporting and can exploit such discretion to manage
income upward in ways that do not increase current taxable income.
Phillips et al. (2003) performed the first empirical study to evaluate the
usefulness of book tax differences in detecting earnings management
relative to various accrual measures. Phillips et al. (2004) proposed that
such earnings management generates book-tax differences that increase a
firm's net deferred tax liabilities and consequently increases its deferred
tax expense. In their study, they found that deferred tax expenses are useful
in detecting earnings management. A similar study in Malaysia by Rohaya
et al. (2007) concluded that firms use deferred tax expenses in managing
earnings to avoid a loss.
Contrary to Rohaya et at. (2007), this study focuses on the change
in net deferred tax liabilities as a proxy for book tax differences and
the detection of earnings management. Furthermore, the study sample
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considers all listed firms, other than financial institutions and focuses
on the early implementation period (2003-2005) of the new MASB 25
accounting standard. The objective of this study is to determine whether
Malaysian firms use net deferred tax liabilities to manage earnings in order
to meet earnings targets, to avoid an earnings decline and to avoid losses.
This paper also investigates the use of discretionary accruals in managing
earnings to meet earnings targets.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section Two
reviews the underlying literature of the study, Section Three discusses the
research methodology, Section Four presents the results and Section Five
concludes the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Earnings management has become one of the most important issues in
accounting since such activity affects the quality of reported earnings.
Beneish (2001) stated that an issue central to accounting research is the
extent to which managers alter reported earnings for their own benefit.
There are several definitions of earnings management in the literature;
Healy and Wahlen (1999) defined earnings management as when managers
use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual
outcomes that depend on reported accounting number, Schipper (1989)
defined earnings management as purposeful intervention in the external
reporting process with the intention of obtaining private gains. In other
words, earnings management is when managers manipulate earnings
figures to achieve a firm's targets.
There are a number of empirical methods by which earnings
management can be detected and measured. Most of the previous studies
have used discretionary accruals models to detect earnings management.
For example, Healy (1985) used totals accrual as a proxy for discretionary
accruals, whereas DeAngelo (1986) measured discretionary accruals as
the difference between total accruals in the current year and the previous
year. In order to control the effects of changes in a firm's economic
circumstances, Jones (1991) proposed a regression model that included
change in revenue and gross property, plant and equipment variables.
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Later, Dechow et al. (1995) modified the model further and is more
commonly referred to as the modified Jones Model.
The modified model takes into consideration adjustment for changes
in receivables during the event period. Differences between accounting
and tax rules have generated book-tax differences, which has been
defined as the difference between accounting income and taxable income
(Plesko, 2004). Mills and Newberry (2001) presented evidence that firms
with incentives relating to earnings management have greater book tax
differences. They stated that managers exercise discretion to manage the
book income upward without increasing the taxable income in preparing
financial statements. Phillips et al. (2003) provided further evidence on
earnings management by using deferred tax expenses as a proxy for book-
tax differences and found evidence that deferred tax expenses are useful
in detecting earnings management. During examination of Malaysian
public listed firms involved in consumer and industrial products, Rohaya
et al. (2007) found evidence that firms used deferred tax expenses and
discretionary accruals in managing tax earnings to avoid a loss.
MASB 25 states that increases and decreases in deferred tax liabilities
will be added to and deducted from the tax expenses, respectively. This
allows firms to manage net deferred tax liabilities and thus increase after
tax earnings (Phillips et al., 2004). The presented study hypothesizes that
Malaysian firms use changes in net deferred tax liabilities, as a proxy for
book-tax differences, thereby managing earnings to meet earnings targets,
avoid earnings decline and avoid a loss. Furthermore it is hypothesized
that the mean change in net deferred tax liabilities and higher discretionary
accrual for earnings management firms is higher than that for non-earnings
management firms
Therefore, the presented study tests the following hypotheses:
HI.: The mean change in net deferred tax liabilities for earnings
management firms is higher than that for non-earnings management
firms in order to avoid an earnings decline.
H1b: The mean discretionary accruals for earnings management firms is
higher than that for non-earnings management firms in order to avoid
an earnings decline.
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H2a: The mean change in net deferred tax liabilities for earnings
management firms is higher than that for non earnings management
firms in order to avoid a loss.
H2b: The mean discretionary accruals for earnings management firms is
higher than that for non-earnings management firm in order to avoid
a loss.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Sample and Data Collection
The sample consists of firms from all industries, excluding financial
institutions, which are listed on the main and secondary boards of Bursa
Malaysia and have available Thompson Datastream data for the period
2003-2005. Since changes in earnings and net deferred tax liabilities are
needed; data for 2002 has also been included . This study excludes firms
listed as financial institutions, since they are highly regulated and may
have different incentives to manage earnings . The period 2003-2005 has
been chosen because MASB 25 came into practice on 1'1 July 2002 and
a new reporting regime; the International Financial Reporting Regime
(IFRS) became mandatory for accounting periods beginning on or after
1'1 January 2006.
All the financial accounting variables used in this study were gathered
from the Thompson Datastream. Firms which do not exhibit net deferred
tax liabilities data in the Thompson Datastream were omitted yielding a
final sample comprising of 1236 firm-year observations.
Methodology and Hypothesis Testing
This study adopts the Burgstahler and Dichev earnings distribution
approach in order to identify earnings management firms, the Healy Model
to compute total accruals and the modified Jones Model to estimate the
discretionary accruals.
This study uses the t-test to evaluate all four hypotheses. Hypotheses
Hla and H2a were evaluated with respect to the mean change in net deferred
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tax liabilities (scaled by total assets) of identified earnings management
firms with respect to non-earnings management firms in order to avoid an
earnings decline and to avoid a loss, respectively.
Hypotheses H1b and H2b have been designed to test whether Malaysian
firms use discretionary accruals as a means to manage earnings to meet
earnings targets in order to avoid an earnings decline and to avoid a loss,
respectively.
The Healy Model has been used to calculate the total accruals, which
may be defined as income before extraordinary items (EBEI) minus cash
flow from operations (CFO), according to Equation (1). All variables are
scaled with respect to the total assets at the end of the previous year.
TAcc . =
l/
where:
EBE/. - CFO.
I t u
(1)
TAcc .
l/
EBE/.
l/
CFO.
l/
=firm i's total accruals in year t;
= firm i's income before extraordinary items in year t:
= firm i's cash flow from operations in year t.
The modified Jones Model was then used to separate the total accruals
into nondiscretionary and discretionary components. Cross-sectional
regression analysis was conducted to estimate the annual parameters for
each industry for each year under study. If an industry has less than six
observations, the sample firms representing the control firm-years are
dropped from the samples in accordance with the works of Defond and
Jiambalvo (1994), Subramanyam (1996) and Eighme (2001). All variables
are scaled with respect to the total assets at the beginning of the year in
order to mitigate size effects. The following equations have been used to
estimate the annual parameters:
(2)
where:
TAcc . =firm i's total accruals in year t;
l/
Malesit =change in firm i's sales from year t-l to t;
PPEit = firm i's gross property, plant and equipment in year t.
Eit = error term for firm i in year t
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All parameters derived from Equation (2) are substituted into
Equation (3) to derive the discretionary accruals for earnings management
firms (EM=!) for both conditions; to avoid an earnings decline and to
avoid a loss. All variables in Equation (3) are scaled with respect to the
total assets.
Tncc; = a + ~I (/1 Sales /1REC ) + A2PPE + c.I 11- II tJ It It
where:
(3)
MECi l = change in firm i's receiving accounts from operating
activities from year r-I to t
Cit = error term for firm i in year t
The discretionary accruals were then calculated as the difference
between total accruals and nondiscretionary accruals for earnings
management firms and non-earnings management firms for each condition.
The mean discretionary accruals for the earnings management firms and
non-earnings management firms were compared in order to evaluate Hlb
and H2b•
RESEARCH FINDINGS
Earnings Management to Avoid an Earnings Decline and to
Avoid A loss
The results using the Burgstahler and Dichev earnings distribution
approach using scaled earnings changes is presented in Figure 1. A firm
is considered to be an earnings management firm in order to avoid an
earnings decline if a scaled earnings change in year t is greater than or
equal to 0 and less than 0.01 of its equity market value at the beginning
of year t-2. However, if a firm reports a scaled earnings change in year
t greater than or equal to -0.01 and less than 0 of its equity market
value at the beginning of year t-2, it is considered to be a non-earnings
management firm. The results indicate that there are an unusually high
number of observations in the slightly positive earnings change interval
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and an unusually low frequency of observations in the slightly negative
earnings change interval. This is consistent with findings of similar studies
by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Phillips et al. (2003) and Rohaya et
al. (2007). The number of observations is 177 firm-years for the slightly
positive earnings change interval and 134 firm-years for the slightly
negative earnings change interval.
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Figure 1: Frequency of Firms across Intervals of Scaled Earnings.
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Figure 2: Frequency of Firms across Intervals of Scaled Earnings Level.
Figure 2 presents the results using the Burgstahler and Dichev
earnings distribution approach using scaled earnings level. If a firm
reports a scaled earnings level in year t of at least 0 and less than 0.02,
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it is considered to be an earnings management firm in order to avoid a
loss. Otherwise, a firm is considered to be a non-earnings management
firm if a scaled earnings change in year t is greater than or equal to -0.02
or less than 0 of its beginning-of-year t-l market value of equity. The
results presented are consistent with previous studies, in that there is an
unusually high frequency of observations in the zero and slightly positive
earnings interval compared to the slightly negative intervals. The number
of observations is 164 firm-years or 13.3% out of 1236 firm-years for
the slightly positive earnings interval and 62 firm-years or 5.0% for the
slightly negative earnings interval.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND T-TEST ANALYSIS
Earnings Management to Avoid an Earnings Decline
Table 1 presents a summary of the statistics for the comparison
of firm-years with zero or slightly positive earnings change (EM l = 1)
and firm-years with slightly negative earnings change (EM l = 0). For
earnings management firms (EM! = 1), the mean change in net deferred
tax liabilities is 0.0049 or 0.49% of the beginning-of-year total assets
(median = 0.0006) with values ranging from -2.50 to 8.58% of total assets.
The mean discretionary accruals is -0.0092 or -0.92% of the beginning-
of-year total assets (median =-0.0002), and the range is between -94.97
to 40.58%. These findings are consistent with the work of Phillips et al.
(2003), whereby the mean change in net deferred tax liabilities is higher
than the mean discretionary accruals.
For the non-earnings management firms (EM! = 0) the changes in
net deferred tax liabilities and discretionary accruals both exhibit positive
means, which is inconsistent with the results obtained by Phillips et al.
(2003) and Rohaya et al. (2007). This study finds that the mean change in
net deferred tax liabilities is 0.0030 or 0.3% of the beginning-of-year total
assets (median = 0.0005) and the mean discretionary accruals is -0.0100 or
-1% of the beginning-of-year total assets (median =0.0071). This means
that the mean discretionary accruals is higher than the mean change in net
deferred tax liabilities for non-earnings management firms.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Earnings Management to Avoid an Earnings Decline
Type N Mean Median Std Maximum Minimum
Deviation
EM1 = 1
Change in Net DTL 177 0.005 0.0006 0.0145 0.0858 -0.0250
DAce 175 -0.009 -0.0002 0.1390 0.4058 -0.9497
EM1=0
Change in Net DTL 134 0.003 0.0005 0.0156 0.0952 -0.0372
DAce 131 0.010 0.0071 0.1073 0.5640 -0.3534
Notes: Change in Net DTL =Annual change in net deferred tax liabilities,
calculated by deducting deferred tax assets from deferred tax
liabilities, between year t-I and t, scaled by total assets at year
t-I, DAce = Discretionary accruals computed using modified
Jones Model (Dechow et aI., 1995)
In order to evaluate hypotheses HI. and H lb the two types of
management firm are statistically compared using the t-test; the results
for which are presented in Table 2. It is expected that if firms manage
earnings upward to avoid reporting an earnings decline, then the earnings
management metrics should reflect such activity . It is expected that
there will be greater changes in net deferred tax liabilities and greater
discretionary accruals in earnings management firm-years than in control
firm-years. The results indicate that the mean changes in net deferred tax
liabilities is larger for EM l = I samples in firm-years that just avoid an
earnings decline than in the non-earnings management firms.The results are
consistent with Rohaya et al. (2007), but the difference is not significant. It
is of interest that in this study the mean discretionary accruals for earnings
management firms is lower than that for non-earnings management firms,
although the difference is not significant, but this is inconsistent with
the findings of Phillips et aI. (2003) and Rohaya et al. (2007). Based on
the t-test , the presented study cannot provide sufficient evidence to infer
that Malaysian firms utilize changes in net deferred tax liabilities and
discretionary accruals to avoid an earnings decline. Therefore, HI. and H lb
cannot be proven.
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Table 2: T·test Analysis Earnings Management to Avoid an Earnings Decline
EM1 =1 EM1=O F-value P-value
Mean Mean
Change in Net 0.005 0.003 0.915 0.340
DTL
DAce -0.009 0.010 1.129 0.289
Earnings Management to Avoid A loss
Table 3 presents a summary of the descriptive statistics for earnings
management and non-earnings management firms in order to avoid a loss.
The mean change in net deferred tax liabilities .is 0.0052 for the earnings
interval of 0 to less than 0.02 of the market value of equity. The mean is
higher than the mean for non-earnings management firms, which is only
0.0022, and indicates that the mean change in net deferred tax liabilities
for both scaled earnings level samples is positive, which is inconsistent
with that obtained by Phillips et al. (2003). However, the positive mean
change in net deferred tax liabilities for EM2 = 1 is consistent with that
determined by Rohaya et al. (2007). The positive mean implies that the
average firm in EM2 =1earnings level sample reports book-income higher
than taxable income.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics Earnings Management to Avoid an Earnings Loss
n Mean Median Std Deviation Maximum Minimum
EM2 = 1
Net DTL 164 0.0052 0.0000 0.0213 0.2159 -0.0632
DAce 156 -0.0265 -0.0229 0.1305 0.5017 -1.0283
EM2=O
NetDTL 62 0.0022 0.0000 0.0138 0.0733 -0.0337
DAce 61 -0.0598 -0.0282 0.2161 0.2631 -1.3376
As with the previous hypotheses, H2a and H2b were evaluated using
the t-test. The results presented in Table 4 indicate that even though the
mean change in net deferred tax liabilities for EM2 = 1 is higher than that
for EM2 =O,the difference is not significant, which is inconsistent with the
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findings of Phillips et at. (2003) and Rohaya et at. (2007). Since there is
no significant difference between the means for both samples, the study
cannot be used to provide evidence that Malaysian firms use changes in
net deferred tax liabilities in managing earnings in order to avoid a loss
and therefore Hz> cannot be proven.
The mean discretionary accruals for the earnings management
firms sample is -0.0265, which is higher than the mean for non-earnings
management firms, Table 4. Statistically there is a significant difference
between the means for both samples with a p-value of 0.05. Therefore
there is evidence that Malaysian firms use discretionary accruals to
manage earnings in order to avoid reporting a loss and HZb is supported,
which agrees with the findings of Rohaya et al. (2007).
Table 4: T-test Analysis Earnings Management to Avoid an Earnings Loss
EM2 = 1 EM2= 0 F-value P-value
Mean Mean
Net DTL 0.0052 0.0022 0.616 0.433
DAce -0.0265 -0.0598 4.524 0.035*
Notes: * significant at 0.05
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the use of changes in net deferred tax liabilities
and discretionary accruals by Malaysian firms in managing earnings to
meet earnings targets. The results indicate that only discretionary accruals
have been used as a means to avoid reporting a loss. However there is no
evidence that Malaysian firms use changes in net deferred tax liabilities in
managing earnings to meet both earnings targets. This study also provides
no conclusive evidence that firms use discretionary accruals in managing
earnings to avoid an earnings decline. It is of note that the results are
consistent with the findings of Phillips et al. (2004), which found no
evidence that changes in net deferred tax liabilities is applicable in the
detection of earnings management to avoid an earnings decline.
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The findings suggest that the implementation of MASB 25 was
effective in minimizing opportunities for Malaysian firms to manage their
earnings through deferred tax. As suggested by Hoe (2003), MASB 25 is
more comprehensive and more specific compared to the previous standard;
the original lAS 12, whereby detailed explanation is given on how to
account for the tax effect, so that all assets and liabilities are stated net
of their tax effect. MASB 25 also requires detailed disclosure on taxation
items, so that the users of financial statements have adequate information
to perform their own evaluation of the tax position of a company. Kiam
(2004) noted that MASB 25 addressed a number of issues, which were
not previously addressed in the old standard, with respect to future tax
consequences arising from past transactions and events within the
reporting framework.
The results of this study contribute to earnings management literature
and would be of use to the researchers studying earnings management
behaviour. By examining specific accruals, such as deferred tax, this study
also provides evidence that there are areas where standards work well and
where there may be room for improvement, which would be of interest
to standard setters. This study could be extended by examining the use of
specific components of deferred tax to manage earnings and future studies
should consider how those components influence the quality of reported
earnings.
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